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the lore is missing from Berenson's version of the
Caillaux affair that it is made to appear much less
convoluted than it was. Finally, the number of factual
errors is troubling, among them the circumstances of
Joseph Caillaux's first election to the Chamber of
Deputies, the details of his elevation to the Ministryof
Finance, the reasons for Georges Clemenceau's long
exclusion from cabinet office, the capacity and reputation of presiding justice Louis Albanel, and the
extent of Radical Party involvement in the Rochette
scandal. In spite of her acquittal, the evidence was
heavily against Mme. Caillaux; the evidence is heavily
against Berenson as well.
BENJAMIN F. MARTIN
LouisianaState University

might reveal that policies that now seem to have been
irrational for the long-term public good of France in
the early 1930s were in fact quite rational for the
short-term private good of those who made them.
Moure also devotes considerable space to reconstructing all the twists and turns in international
monetary relations and domestic policy formation
between 1928 and 1936, from the Anglo-French
negotiations on gold flows before 1931 (chap. 2), to
the politics and diplomacy of the London Economic
Conference of 1933 (chap. 3), to the tortuous process
by which the franc was finally devalued in 1936
(chaps. 6 and 7). It is always salutary to be reminded
that large policies are usually the cumulative product
of many small decisions, but there is also a danger of
not seeing the forest for the trees. And Moure does
point out a lot of trees. In any case, much of the
KENNETH MOURC.Managingthefranc Poincare:
Eco- diplomatic and political history that he recounts will
nomic Understandingand Political Constraintin French be of interest mainly to the handful of scholars
MonetaryPolicy,1928-1936. (Studies in Monetary and working on this topic. Of more general interest-at
Financial Policy.) New York: Cambridge University least to economic historians of modern France-are
Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 314. $59.50.
chapters 4 and 5, which provide an excellent explanation of how the Bank of France functioned in this
Drawing on a wide variety of published and unpubera and how it interacted with the treasury in its
lished sources (including files of the Bank of France
efforts to manage the currency and maintain the
and the Bank of England, French and British treasolvency of the French state.
sury papers, and the private papers of Vincent AuUltimately, Moure's search for the source of
riol, Paul Reynaud, Frederick Leith-Ross, Henry
France's ill-conceived monetary policy takes him beMorgenthau, and nAanyothers), Kenneth Moure has
yond the thought and actions of specific leaders and
put together a remarkably detailed and nuanced
the details of diplomacy and politics to what might be
account of France's ill-fated effort to return to the
termed France's "official mind" on the monetary
gold standard between 1928 and 1936. Accepting the
issue: more specifically, the quasi-religious commitwidely held diagnosis that overvaluation of the franc
ment to gold that emerged (or reemerged) in official
was the root cause of France's persistent economic
circles in response to the monetary problems of the
difficulties after 1931, Moure seeks to explain why the
early 1920s. Once institutionalized in the franc PoinFrench clung so tenaciously to the gold-backed "franc care
and seemingly validated by France's apparent
Poincar6"-and adopted the severely deflationary
immunity to the initial stages of the world Depression
policies that its defense required-in the face of in
1929-30, this commitment prevented France from
mounting evidence that such policies precluded real
following Britain and America off the gold standard
economic recovery. In essence, he wants to determine in
1931-33 and, indeed, locked it instead into the
why French officials acted less "rationally"in dealing
disastrous deflationary policies of 1931-35. Only
with the Great Depression than their British, Ger- when the
Popular Front took power in 1936 did a
man, and American counterparts.
change in French monetary policy become possible,
Moure gives much attention to the public and and even then it was undertaken so reluctantly and in
private writings of the bank and treasury managers, such a clumsy and ill-timed fashion as to virtually
politicians, and financial experts most responsible for ensure continued economic crisis. Having learned the
formulating French monetary policy in the late 1920s wrong economic lessons from its experience of the
and early 1930s. He tends to assume that these were 1920s, France had to unlearn them the hard way.
public-spirited men whose only sin was faulty "ecoLike most books that are in fact lightly revised
nomic understanding." And perhaps they were. In- doctoral dissertations, this one presumes extensive
asmuch, however, as France in these years had more knowledge of the subject and is inevitably intended
than its share of shady operators looking for political for a small scholarly audience. Nonetheless, it is an
favors and more than its share of financial scandals unusually well-researched work that sheds much light
(of which the Stavisky affair was the most notorious), on a difficult subject. In the process, it eloquently
Moure might have given more attention to the dark announces the arrival of a talented young historian
side of French public finance, including the role of from whom we may expect more excellent work in
currency speculation and what Jean-Noel Jeanneney the future.
calls "hidden money." A closer look at the private
MICHAEL S. SMITH
connections and interests of French decision makers
Universityof South Carolina
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